Differences

This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.

Link to this comparison view

Both sides previous revision Previous revision
Next revision
Previous revision
fertility_and_religious_practice [2015/11/06 06:56]
marri
fertility_and_religious_practice [2017/11/30 15:10] (current)
marri [3. The Role of Religious Practice]
Line 1: Line 1:
 ==========Fertility and Religious Practice========== ==========Fertility and Religious Practice==========
  
-In the last several decades, the [[state_of_the_family_in_america|intact married religious family]] has eroded ​as the cultural norm in the Western world.  ​Its replacement—extra-marital and non-marital sexual practices, a rejection of childbearing,​ and areligious sentiments—has prompted a fertility crisis. The continuance of Western nations and peoples depends on the restoration of [[effects_of_religious_practice_on_society|religious worship]] and sexual mores.  ​+In the last several decades, the [[state_of_the_family_in_america|intact married religious family]] has diminished ​as the cultural norm in the Western world.  ​What weakened it—extra-marital and non-marital sexual practices, a rejection of childbearing,​ and areligious sentiments—has prompted a fertility crisis. The continuance of Western nations and peoples depends on the restoration of [[effects_of_religious_practice_on_society|religious worship]] and sexual mores.  ​
  
 =====1. Fertility Trends in Europe===== =====1. Fertility Trends in Europe=====
Line 9: Line 9:
 {{ :​fertility_in_europe.png?​direct&​400 |Total Fertility Rates in Europe}} {{ :​fertility_in_europe.png?​direct&​400 |Total Fertility Rates in Europe}}
  
-The below chart from 2001 illustrates the difference between the attained fertility of European women depending on their age,((A newly formed marriage of a 20 year-old woman receives nearly a full weight (100 percent) on the y-axis, as that marriage has the potential to bring many children into the world if contraceptive means are not employed. A new marriage formed by a 50 year-old woman would receive no weight (0 percent) as that marriage statistically will not bring children into the world. \\ See Henry Potrykus and Patrick Fagan, ​"Marriage, Contraception & The Future of Western Peoples," ​Marriage and Religion Research Institute (2011), available ​at [[http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF11K50.pdf]].)) compared to their potential fertility (which was gauged by the actual fertility of Hutterite women).((The upper, blue curve in this chart is a sociologically---not biologically---determined potential fertility. It is the fertility achieved by an Anabaptist sect settled in the north-central United States which adhered to a religious prohibition of contraceptives. This depiction of high fertility also represents with some faithfulness the traditional delay of marriage (and fertility in marriage) seen in Western societies.)) The number of children actually born (red area) is a much smaller percent of the number of potential children (blue area). ​+The below chart from 2001 illustrates the difference between the attained fertility of European women depending on their age,((A newly formed marriage of a 20 year-old woman receives nearly a full weight (100 percent) on the y-axis, as that marriage has the potential to bring many children into the world if contraceptive means are not employed. A new marriage formed by a 50 year-old woman would receive no weight (0 percent) as that marriage statistically will not bring children into the world. \\ See Henry Potrykus and Patrick Fagan, ​//Marriage, Contraception & The Future of Western Peoples//, Marriage and Religion Research Institute (2011). Available ​at [[http://marri.us/research/​research-papers/​marriage-contraception-the-future-of-western-peoples/]].)) compared to their potential fertility (which was gauged by the actual fertility of Hutterite women).((The upper, blue curve in this chart is a sociologically---not biologically---determined potential fertility. It is the fertility achieved by an Anabaptist sect settled in the north-central United States which adhered to a religious prohibition of contraceptives. This depiction of high fertility also represents with some faithfulness the traditional delay of marriage (and fertility in marriage) seen in Western societies.)) The number of children actually born (red area) is a much smaller percent of the number of potential children (blue area). ​
  
 {{ :​married_female_fertility.png?​direct&​350 |Married Female Fertility}} {{ :​married_female_fertility.png?​direct&​350 |Married Female Fertility}}
Line 22: Line 22:
 {{ :​major_cultural_transitions_effects.png?​direct&​600 |Major Cultural Transitions'​ Effects}} {{ :​major_cultural_transitions_effects.png?​direct&​600 |Major Cultural Transitions'​ Effects}}
  
-Taking hold after the on-set of industrialization in the West, the contraceptive mindset (fewer children) is of one cloth with the West shifting its economic orientation from family enterprise to individualist labor activity while simultaneously moving from religious to secular social values.((Ron Lesthaeghe and Chris Wilson, “Modes of Production, Secularization,​ and the Pace of the Fertility Decline in Western Europe, 1870-1930,"​ in //The Decline of Fertility in Europe//, ​ed. by Ansley Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins ​(Princeton University Press, 1986) Chapter 6. \\ Theresa Notare, “A Revolution in Christian Morals: Lambeth 1930, Resolution 15—History and Reception,"​ PhD Thesis at the Catholic University of America, 2008.))  ​+Taking hold after the on-set of industrialization in the West, the contraceptive mindset (fewer children) is of one cloth with the West shifting its economic orientation from family enterprise to individualist labor activity while simultaneously moving from religious to secular social values.((Ron Lesthaeghe and Chris Wilson, “Modes of Production, Secularization,​ and the Pace of the Fertility Decline in Western Europe, 1870-1930,"​ in ed. by Ansley Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins ​//The Decline of Fertility in Europe//, (Princeton University Press, 1986) Chapter 6. \\ Theresa Notare, “A Revolution in Christian Morals: Lambeth 1930, Resolution 15—History and Reception,"​ PhD Thesis at the Catholic University of America, 2008.))  ​
  
-The marriage trend has been less consistent. Current sexual-revolution norms have deeply reduced the propensity to marry.((Mark Regnerus, “Sex is Cheap,” //Slate// (February 2011) available ​at [[http://​www.slate.com/​articles/​double_x/​doublex/​2011/​02/​sex_is_cheap.html]]. \\ Joseph Anthony Burke and Catherine Pakaluk, ​//The Contraceptive Revolution and the Second Demographic Transition: An Economic Model of Sex, Fertility, and Marriage//Ave Maria University, no. 1003 (2010).)) Governments,​ the U.N., International Planned Parenthood, Marie Stopes and other foundations,​ as well as all who have adopted the new model of how society is to function, continue to work to establish these polymorphous sexual norms. In the past, and especially during the marriage boom of the 1950s (center chart below),​((John Hajnal, ​The Marriage Boom, //​Population Studies// 7.2 (1953): 111-136.)) there was a tendency toward earlier and long-lasting marriage. This tendency and its [[effects.of.marriage.on.couples.relationships|appreciation of the importance of the family]] allowed for replacement rates of fertility, seen especially in the ‘baby boom’ of the marriage boom.+The marriage trend has been less consistent. Current sexual-revolution norms have deeply reduced the propensity to marry.((Mark Regnerus, “Sex is Cheap,” //Slate// (February 2011). Available ​at [[http://​www.slate.com/​articles/​double_x/​doublex/​2011/​02/​sex_is_cheap.html]]. \\ Joseph Anthony Burke and Catherine Pakaluk, ​"The Contraceptive Revolution and the Second Demographic Transition: An Economic Model of Sex, Fertility, and Marriage," ​//Ave Maria University//, no. 1003 (2010).)) Governments,​ the U.N., International Planned Parenthood, Marie Stopes and other foundations,​ as well as all who have adopted the new model of how society is to function, continue to work to establish these polymorphous sexual norms. In the past, and especially during the marriage boom of the 1950s (center chart below),​((John Hajnal, ​"The Marriage Boom," ​//​Population Studies// 7, no. 2 (1953): 111-136.)) there was a tendency toward earlier and long-lasting marriage. This tendency and its [[effects.of.marriage.on.couples.relationships|appreciation of the importance of the family]] allowed for replacement rates of fertility, seen especially in the ‘baby boom’ of the marriage boom.
  
 This information is condensed in the chart below. The evolution of views on marriage and contraception in the West has resulted in fertility levels far below the needed replacement number of successors. It now approaches 1.5 children per couple, which is much less than the required 2.1. This information is condensed in the chart below. The evolution of views on marriage and contraception in the West has resulted in fertility levels far below the needed replacement number of successors. It now approaches 1.5 children per couple, which is much less than the required 2.1.
Line 48: Line 48:
 Mueller elegantly develops and deftly illustrates at the macro level the differential impacts of two opposing elements that vie within the heart of all parents: a selfless giving to their children for the benefit of their children, and the competing element of ‘giving to their children for their own personal benefit’ (such as to be taken care of in their old age). Mueller elegantly develops and deftly illustrates at the macro level the differential impacts of two opposing elements that vie within the heart of all parents: a selfless giving to their children for the benefit of their children, and the competing element of ‘giving to their children for their own personal benefit’ (such as to be taken care of in their old age).
  
-Mueller comments, “The problems just recounted are the inevitable result of attempting to explain anything so fundamental as fertility ---the reproduction of human persons---without the element of economic theory that describes one’s preferences for persons” (//​Redeeming Economics//,​ 236). +Mueller comments, “The problems just recounted are the inevitable result of attempting to explain anything so fundamental as fertility ---the reproduction of human persons---without the element of economic theory that describes one’s preferences for persons” ​((//​Redeeming Economics//,​ 236)). 
  
 The below chart illustrates the positive relationship between frequency of weekly religious practice and national fertility rates. The below chart illustrates the positive relationship between frequency of weekly religious practice and national fertility rates.
Line 54: Line 54:
 {{ :​weekly_worship_v._fertility.png?​direct&​600 |Weekly Worship vs. Fertility}} {{ :​weekly_worship_v._fertility.png?​direct&​600 |Weekly Worship vs. Fertility}}
  
-The more frequently people worship God, across all religions and nations, the more likely they are to [[effects_of_religious_practice_on_society|give selflessly]]. ​ As we have seen, a 100 percent rate of weekly [[effects_of_religious_practice_on_family_relationships|religious worship yields 2.1 more children]] per mother or per family. According to Mueller, "After purely selfish factors are accounted for, acting on belief in God and some kind of afterlife makes the crucial difference as to whether people reproduce themselves. ​ It suggests that the personal gift of time and resources involved in worship is closely and systematically associated with the personal gift of having children for their own sake rather than for the pleasure and utility of the parents"​ (//​Redeeming Economics//,​ 238-239).+The more frequently people worship God, across all religions and nations, the more likely they are to [[effects_of_religious_practice_on_society|give selflessly]]. ​ As we have seen, a 100 percent rate of weekly [[effects_of_religious_practice_on_family_relationships|religious worship yields 2.1 more children]] per mother or per family. According to Mueller, "After purely selfish factors are accounted for, acting on belief in God and some kind of afterlife makes the crucial difference as to whether people reproduce themselves. ​ It suggests that the personal gift of time and resources involved in worship is closely and systematically associated with the personal gift of having children for their own sake rather than for the pleasure and utility of the parents" ​((//​Redeeming Economics//,​ 238-239)).
  
 The total fertility rate (TFR) in countries where the rate of weekly worship is close to zero is 1.25.  Where weekly worship is 100 percent, the net TFR is 3.4, or 2.1 children higher.  ​ The total fertility rate (TFR) in countries where the rate of weekly worship is close to zero is 1.25.  Where weekly worship is 100 percent, the net TFR is 3.4, or 2.1 children higher.  ​
Line 66: Line 66:
 {{ :​total_fertility_rate-_predicted_v._actual.png?​direct&​600 |Total Fertility Rate: Predicted vs. Actual}} {{ :​total_fertility_rate-_predicted_v._actual.png?​direct&​600 |Total Fertility Rate: Predicted vs. Actual}}
  
-However, as the below chart from the "​International Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism"​((Ijaz Shafi, Gilani, Rushna Shahid, and Irene Zuettel, "​Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism,"​ WIN-Gallup Gallup International (2012), available ​at [[http://​www.wingia.com/​web/​files/​news/​14/​file/​14.pdf]]. +However, as the below chart from the "​International Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism"​((Ijaz Shafi, Gilani, Rushna Shahid, and Irene Zuettel, "​Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism,"​ WIN-Gallup ​//Gallup International// (2012). Available ​at [[http://​www.wingia.com/​web/​files/​news/​14/​file/​14.pdf]].)) illustrates,​ most countries are experiencing a significant decline in rates of religiosity (not exactly the same as weekly religious worship, but a closely related indicator).
-\\ +
-\\ +
-\\ +
-This entry draws heavily from John D. Mueller, //Redeeming Economics: Rediscovering the Missing Element//, (Wilmington,​ DE: ISI Books, 2010) and "​[[http://​downloads.frc.org/​EF/​EF11K50.pdf| Marriage, Contraception & The Future of Western Peoples]]"​)) illustrates,​ most countries are experiencing a significant decline in rates of religiosity (not exactly the same as weekly religious worship, but a closely related indicator).+
  
 The implication of these data and insights is significant:​ Europe (and other nations) face the choice of a return to worshipping God or gradually declining. ​ The implication of these data and insights is significant:​ Europe (and other nations) face the choice of a return to worshipping God or gradually declining. ​
Line 127: Line 123:
 {{ :​wcf_poor_communities_education.png?​direct&​450 |Neighborhood Poverty and Academic On-Track Performance}} {{ :​wcf_poor_communities_education.png?​direct&​450 |Neighborhood Poverty and Academic On-Track Performance}}
  
-=====4. A New Social Policy====+=====4. Trends Among Particular Religious Denominations===== 
 +Although Christianity is the largest religious denomination in the world, declining fertility rates—particularly in Europe((Hackett,​ Conrade and David McClendon, "​Christians Remain World'​s Largest Religious Group, But They Are Declining in Europe,"​ Pew Research Center (April 2017), available at [[http://​www.pewresearch.org/​fact-tank/​2017/​04/​05/​christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-group-but-they-are-declining-in-europe/​]].))—indicate that this may no longer be the case by 2060.((Lipka,​ Michael and Conrad Hackett, "Why Muslims Are the World'​s Fastest Growing Religious Group,"​ Pew Research Center (April 2017), available at [[http://​www.pewresearch.org/​fact-tank/​2017/​04/​06/​why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/​]].)) Religious Nones are also projected to decline as a share of the world’s population due to their exceptionally low fertility rate.((Pew Research Center, April 5, 2017, “The Changing Global Religious Landscape,​” available at [[http://​assets.pewresearch.org/​wp-content/​uploads/​sites/​11/​2017/​04/​07092755/​FULL-REPORT-WITH-APPENDIXES-A-AND-B-APRIL-3.pdf]].)) Muslims, who had the highest fertility rate of all religious denominations and made up roughly 31 percent of all births from 2010-2015, will likely replace Christians.((Pew Research Center, April 5, 2017, “The Changing Global Religious Landscape,​” available at [[http://​assets.pewresearch.org/​wp-content/​uploads/​sites/​11/​2017/​04/​07092755/​FULL-REPORT-WITH-APPENDIXES-A-AND-B-APRIL-3.pdf]]. 
 +\\ 
 +\\ 
 +\\ 
 +This entry draws heavily from John D. Mueller, //Redeeming Economics: Rediscovering the Missing Element//, (Wilmington,​ DE: ISI Books, 2010) and [[http://​marri.us/​research/​research-papers/​marriage-contraception-the-future-of-western-peoples/​| "​Marriage,​ Contraception & The Future of Western Peoples"​]].)) 
 + 
 +=====5. A New Social Policy====
  
 On every outcome measured by the U.S. statistical system---and frequency of worship is one of the variables measured in at least eight different major federal surveys---the more frequent the rate of worship, ​ the better the persons tend to do on positive outcomes. For undesirable outcomes the opposite holds: the more frequent people worship, the less frequent their negative outcomes. On every outcome measured by the U.S. statistical system---and frequency of worship is one of the variables measured in at least eight different major federal surveys---the more frequent the rate of worship, ​ the better the persons tend to do on positive outcomes. For undesirable outcomes the opposite holds: the more frequent people worship, the less frequent their negative outcomes.